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EU Hotspot Approach and EU-Turkey Statement in




With the entry into force of the EU-Turkey Statement on 20
March 2016, the political purpose of the EU Hotspots in
Greece has been overhauled completely. Originally, EU
Hotspots had been presented as a mechanism to implement
the EU Relocation Program. Since 20 March 2016 however,
the main purpose is the implementation of the return policy.
The fast-track border procedure – applied in the EU
Hotspots by Greek authorities with support by the European
Asylum Support Office – is thus characterized by a
preliminary admissibility procedure assessing whether Turkey can be considered as
„safe third country“.
EU Hotspot Approach in Greece – from relocation to return?
What is the purpose of the EU Hotspot Approach? The primary aim is to „assist frontline
[sic!] Member States in meeting the challegnges presented by high migratory pressures at
the EU’s external borders“. EU Hotspots can thus be understood as platforms for
operational support by EU Agencies – most importantly the European Asylum Support
Office (EASO), Frontex and Europol. However, operational support is not an end in itself, it
serves an underlying purpose. In this regard, „the absence of legal clarity [as to the
fundamental objectives of hotspots] is worrying“.
Originally, the Hotspot Approach had been presented and understood inter alia as a tool to
implement the EU Relocation Program. The idea of the Relocation Scheme, introduced by
two Council Decisions adopted under Art. 78 para. 3 TFEU, was to alleviate pressure on
national asylum systems located at the EU external border – a corrective measure which
had become necessary due to the misallocation of responsibilities under the Dublin-III-
Regulation. Quite apart from the fact that implementation of the Relocation Program hardly
ever worked, asylum seekers who arrived at EU Hotspots located on the Greek islands as
from 20 March 2016 have been treated as non-eligible for relocation in administrative
practice – despite the lack of a clear legal basis for this view.
The reason is obvious. The first provision of the EU-Turkey Statement published only as a
Press Release on 18 March 2016 reads: „All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey
into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey. This will take place in
full accordance with EU and international law […]“. Indeed, the main purpose of the EU
Hotspots in Greece is now the implementation of the return policy.
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EU-Turkey Statement – not an EU act?
On 28 February 2017, the  General Court (EU Court of First Instance) surprisingly decided
that the EU was not a party to the EU-Turkey Statement.
The General Court based its conclusion mainly on the circumstances of the adoption of the
EU-Turkey Statement. On 17 and 18 March 2016, two meetings were held in the building
usually used for the meetings of the European Council and those of the Council. The
General Court concluded that in the first meeting, the heads of the EU Member States
came together as members of the Council, but that the second meeting – the one in which
the EU-Turkey Statement was adopted – was an international summit in which the heads of
the Member States met with their Turkish counterpart. The Court interpreted the
circumstances – such as invitation letter, protocols and table signs –  as „corroborating the
fact“ that the EU was not involved in the adoption of the EU-Turkey Statement.
The reasoning of the General Court is not convincing. First: Even if the approach in
evaluating the factual circumstances was correct, the conclusion of the Court is not
persuasive. The meetings on 17 and 18 March were held in order to give effect to the EU
Turkey Joint Action Plan of October 2015, the implementation of which had been in the
hands of EU institutions. Second and more importantly: According to case law of the
European Court of Justice (22/70 – AERT), the decisive question is the allocation of powers
according to the Treaties. Considering the scope of Art. 78 et seq. TFEU, a lot speaks in
favor of the conclusion that only the EU would have had the competence to conclude such
an agreement with Turkey. Member States cannot amend the allocation of powers under
the Treaties simply by changing invitation letters and protocols of the relevant meetings.
An appeal to the European Court of Justice has been lodged. The outcome is awaited.
Implementation – blurred responsibilities and accountability
Despite the numerous open questions on the EU-Turkey Statement – regarding the parties
and whether it is of legally binding nature – the European Commission on 18 March 2016
appointed the General Director of the SRSS as „EU Coordinator“ for the implementation of
the EU Turkey Statement in Greece. Although the tasks of the EU Coordinator are not
clearly defined, in December 2016 he concluded a „Joint Action Plan“ with Greece aiming at
increased efficiency of the return policy by further limiting procedural rights and enhancing
detention capacity on the islands.
Implementation of the Hotspot approach at the central level lies with the so-called „inter-
agency coordination meetings“, chaired by the SRSS and in which national authorities and
EU agencies participate. Coordination at operational level lies with the EU Regional Task
Force in which national authorities are not represented and the responsibilities of which are
not defined either.
Obviously, the „diffusion and overlap of competences […] renders accountability and […]
attribution of liability quite blurry.“
Hotspot Procedure – framed towards the aim of return
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The amendment of the political purpose of the EU Hotspots obviously had severe
repercussions both on reception conditions and on asylum procedures. The mandatory
systematic detention scheme which had initially been introduced after 20 March 2016 has
meanwhile been replaced by restrictions on the asylum seeker’s freedom of movement to
the respective island. Humanitarian conditions in the overcrowded hotspots are currently
deteriorating again.
Since 20 March 2016, the EU Hotspot procedure is characterized by two main features.
First, it is conducted in the form of a so-called fast-track border procedure (under Art. 60
para. 4 Greek Asylum Law 4375/2016). The applicability of this special procedure
introduced as a crisis mechanism has been extended again (Art. 86 para. 20 Law
4399/2016). On the one hand, procedural rights are severely limited in the fast-track border
procedure, for instance, the time limit for an appeal is reduced to (merely) five days (Art. 61
para. 1 lit. d Law 4375/2016). On the other hand, enhanced involvement of the EU agency
EASO is allowed for, in particular to support with conducting interviews. In practice, in the
majority of cases EASO conducts the admissibility interview and drafts a so-called
„concluding observation“ on the basis of which the Greek authority then issues its decision.
The Greek Council of State in its decision of 22 September 2017 decided that the
involvement of EASO does not exceed the limits imposed by Law 4375/2016. According to
EU law, however, EASO „shall have no powers in relation to the taking of decisions by
Member States’ asylum authorities on individual applications for international protection“
(Art. 2 para. 6 EASO Regulation). In this regard, a complaint to the European Ombudsman
has been lodged in April 2017.
Second, a preliminary admissibility procedure has been introduced: In case Turkey can be
considered as a “safe third country” or a “first country of asylum” (under Art. 55, 56 Law
4375/2016 transposing Art. 35, 38 Asylum Procedures Directive), the asylum claim is
dismissed as inadmissible (under Art 54 para 1 Law 4375/2016 transposing Art 33 Asylum
Procedures Directive). Obviously, the question whether Turkey can be considered a “safe
third country” is essential when it comes to implementing the return policy as foreseen by
the EU-Turkey Statement. The European Commission has clearly expressed its view
towards the Greek authorities. Until now however, the Greek Appeals Committees and
Administrative Courts have been reluctant in accepting the Commission’s view. In some
cases, the required „connection“ of the asylum seeker to Turkey (Art. 56 para. 1 lit. f Law
4375/2016) could not be established. In other cases reports have been invoked pointing to
the fact that neither the legal nor the factual situation in Turkey comply with the
requirements of a “safe third country”. The Council of State in its decision on 22 September
2017, however, ruled in individual cases that Turkey can be considered as „safe“.
The implications of this precedent on administrative practice in Greece remain to be seen.
The contribution is part of a series of three articles regarding the EU-Turkey Statement and
the EU Hotspot Approach in Greece – it is preceded by yesterday’s text by ELENI TAKOU,
an article by CLARA ANNE BÜNGER and ROBERT NESTLER will follow. For a more
detailed analysis see: Catharina Ziebritzki and Robert Nestler, „Hotspots“ at the EU
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External Border. A Legal Survey (Working Paper). Available online (in German): Max
Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law & International Law (MPIL) Research Paper
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